Globalization as a double process of institutional change and institution building by Djelic, Marie-Laure & Quack, Sigrid
1  
   
Conclusion 
 
Globalization as a double process of institutional change and institution building  
 
Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack 
 
Globalization is a word that suffers from overuse. Still, behind the overstretched concept lies 
the reality of an economic world that is not fully contained nor constrained by national 
boundaries. Economic organization and coordination increasingly reach across national 
borders and the impact is being felt both within the transnational sphere and, through rebound 
and indirect impact, at the national level as well. We started this book by acknowledging the 
need to take into account this transnational reality and its potentially quite significant impact. 
We now want to point, however, to its full complexity. 
 The focus in previous chapters has been on globalization as a dependent variable, an 
‘object’ to be explained rather than an independent variable or an explanatory factor. 
Globalization can be taken as a given, a context and reality with a significant impact on 
economic behaviour and coordination – but also potentially on cultural repertoires, political 
processes and human interactions. This is indeed the approach that dominates in journalistic 
contributions as well as in most academic work. Questions tend to bear on how globalization 
is changing our lives or in Giddens’ words how it is ‘reshaping our lives’ (2000). Generally, 
the picture that emerges from that kind of approach is one where globalization is a neutral, 
impersonal, inevitable and a-historical force (Guillèn 2001).  
 Our collective understanding and project in this book has been both different and 
complementary. We have treated globalization as a phenomenon in the making, to be 
described, explained and understood. This phenomenon is worthy of being studied in itself 
and not only for the consequences it may have. Our objective was to take the first steps in that 
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direction. Chapter after chapter, we have engaged in this book in the problematization and 
deconstruction of the phenomenon of globalization. Naturally there have been quite a few 
episodes in world history of internationalization of economic activities (see e.g. Wallerstein 
1974, Robertson 1992, Murphy 1994, Williamson 1996, 1997 or Moore and Lewis 2000). Our 
focus however has been on the latest of such episodes, to which we reserve the term 
globalization. We see it starting after the end of World War II (McKenna et al., Whitley and 
Lehmkuhl in this volume) and accelerating significantly from the 1980s (all other 
contributions to this volume).  
 
 
Deconstructing globalization 
 
Deconstructing the phenomenon of globalization requires a contextualization of the multiple 
layers and empirical forms that make up and reveal that phenomenon. The empirical chapters 
above delineate three main paths to contextualization, which contributors have combined in 
different ways and to different degrees.  
 The first path has been the reintroduction of history and the attempt to take a long 
view on any particular layer or dimension of the globalization story. This path appears 
particularly salient in the chapters by McKenna et al., Whitley, Lilja and Moen or Plehwe. 
The main points of focus there have been the question of origins, the identification of 
moments of bifurcation and the description of the process of emergence of new logics. A 
second path has been the emphasis on actors and the identification of their multiple and 
sometimes conflicting motivations, interests and strategies. This comes out quite clearly in the 
contributions by Tainio et al., Kleiner or McNichol and Bensedrine. The third path, finally, 
has been a systematic focus on the interplay or articulation between the global or transnational 
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on the one hand and the local or national on the other. Without any exception, this path has 
been followed by all contributors.   
 At this stage of our collective road, the picture of globalization that emerges is far 
from glossy or unitary. Rather than an end, naturally, this chapter is probably the conclusion 
of a first step and hopefully a solid beginning. Nevertheless, we can already start making a 
number of observations. From the combination of contributions to this book, globalization 
clearly does not seem to be a smooth, unitary and neutral reality. Rather, it very much appears 
to be a multilevel and multilayered historical process, which is socially constructed and 
locally contested and reveals coexisting, competing and conflicting actors and logics. 
Globalization, we find, is a process or even more precisely a combination of multiple and 
partly interrelated processes, meaning that it is still very much open ended and in 
construction. Rather than a given reality or inevitable force bringing along and triggering 
significant transformations, we propose that globalization might be seen in fact as the sum 
and combination of transformations, an emergent and emerging multilayered construction.  
 This understanding of globalization as an aggregation of multilayered and multilevel 
open-ended processes, as a sedimenting and dynamic construction does resonate with recent 
calls in the academic debate to move away from static, homogeneous and unitary 
conceptualizations of globalization and towards understandings that take in complexity (Held 
et al. 1999, Guidry et al. 2001, Guillèn 2001). The step we take in this volume makes it 
possible to point to some of the key mechanisms of complexity and hence contributes to 
reducing it, at least to some degree. The set of empirical chapters in this volume reveals that 
interactions, competitions or conflicts between different actors, different institutions and 
different rationalities, are constitutive of the globalization phenomenon. The latest episode of 
globalization is the aggregated result of those multiple interactions, conflicts and 
contestations. Interactions, conflicts and contestations are taking place within national spaces, 
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at the borders of the national space as well as in the transnational arenas. And they are not the 
same everywhere. Taken collectively, the contributions to this book show that these 
interactions and conflicts are contingent and contextual, which accounts for the multiplicity 
and variety of layers in the phenomenon of globalization.  
 
 
Globalization and institutional rules of the game 
 
Behind a glossy word, we find therefore a collection of contested and discontinuous 
processes. The chapters in this book collectively also seem to show that the tensions, 
discontinuities and contestations that fall under the label ‘globalization’ are fundamental and 
profound ones. The contemporary episode of globalization has been naturally about the 
internationalization of exchanges, about flows of goods, money, technology, organisations 
and people across national borders (e.g. Ohmae 1990, Sassen 1998, Giddens 2000, Guillèn 
2001). It has indeed been about the ‘widening, deepening and speeding up of global 
interconnectedness’ (Held et al. 1999, p. 14). In that sense, globalization shares quite a few 
similarities with earlier episodes of internationalization of economic activity (Murphy 1994, 
Moore and Lewis 2000, James 2001). The conclusion we reach however, looking at the 
empirical contributions to this volume, is that the internationalization of exchanges or 
increasing interconnectedness are probably only the tip of the iceberg, mere epiphenomena, in 
contemporary globalization.  
 The most striking about globalization we argue is that it seems to be principally and 
deeply about institutional logics and systems, about conflicting contextual or ‘bounded 
rationalities’ (Kristensen 2000), about what we call here ‘rules of the game’. We focus in this 
volume on the economic dimension of the episode of globalization that started after 1945 to 
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accelerate in the 1980s. Hence our interest lies in rules of the economic game although the 
argument is likely to be valid in a much more general way, well beyond the economic sphere. 
As illustrated by the contributions to this volume, globalization means contested negotiations 
and renegotiations of those ‘rules of the economic game’. And those negotiations and 
renegotiations mean conflicts between preexisting sets of rules, possibly translate in re-
combinations using preexisting bits and pieces or even lead to the emergence of entirely new 
rules or sets of rules.  
 In the way we use it, the term ‘rules of the economic game’ is wide and encompassing. 
It resonates with the idea of an institutional backbone for economic activity. The institutional 
frame in which economic activity takes place is in part structural – laws and regulations, 
political institutions and structured channels of interaction, education and financial systems 
amongst others (Whitley 1992, 1999). We find examples and illustrations of the defining role 
of those structural rules in most if not all contributions to this volume. At the same time, 
structural frames often reveal or combine with normative, cognitive or ideological rules 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977, Campbell 1998). Quite a number of contributions to this volume 
empirically document that (Tainio et al., Kleiner, Lilja and Moen, Nichol and Bensedrine, 
Ventresca et al.). We propose the term ‘rules of the economic game’ to encompass both the 
structural and normative institutions that frame economic activity in any particular context. 
Collectively, we thus break the firewall that tends to separate those who define institutions as 
structures from those who see them as normative and cognitive frames (this firewall has been 
one of the main problems with neoinstitutional theory, see e.g. Campbell 1998, Clemens and 
Cook 1999, Djelic 2001). Rather than opposing structural or material and ideological 
analyses, we contend that both are necessary.  
 Globalization is at the very same time a material and an ideational phenomenon. An 
important contribution of this volume, we believe, is to show that globalization is about these 
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institutional ‘rules of the game’, both the structural and the normative/cognitive ones and their 
transformation particularly in the recent past. Our collective results point in two different 
directions.  
 At a first level, globalisation is about the redefinition of economic rules of the game 
and institutional systems within national spaces, for the most part through a slow and 
incremental process. Globalization is about institutional change and the evolution and 
transformation of national business systems (Whitley 1992) and ‘national business 
rationalities’ (using and transforming a term coined by Dobbin who talked in 1994 of 
‘national industrial rationalities’). This comes out particularly clearly in the contributions by 
Tainio et al., Kleiner, McKenna et al. or Whitley, which were grouped together under Part I of 
this book.  
 Then, at a second level globalization is also about the elaboration of new rules for the 
economic game, about the building of new institutional frames particularly within the space 
between and across nations. This we have found to be illustrated and documented quite 
clearly in the contributions by Lilja and Moen, Plehwe, Midttun and Micola, McNichol and 
Bensedrine, Ventresca et al. or Lehmkuhl. This second group of contributions constitutes part 
II of this volume.  
 We have separated contributions in two groups in this manner mostly for analytical 
purposes. The first set of chapters does have as a common focus the transformation of 
national institutional systems. The second set is clearly better defined by an interest in the 
building and emergence of new institutional frames at a transnational level. Nevertheless, all 
contributors see and acknowledge the interactions between these two types of processes – 
institutional change at the national level and institution building at the transnational level. 
Those interactions play themselves out in a way that is schematically illustrated in figure 1.  
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Figure 1 about here 
We have collectively argued in this book that transnational institution (or rule) building may 
be one of the most striking features of the current period of internationalisation. As Part II 
shows, this process of institution building at the cross-national or transnational level cannot be 
conceived in total isolation and abstraction from national rules of the game. Even in cases of 
multilateral negotiations such as the one described by McNichol and Bensedrine the 
objectives, projects, resources and logics of participants – be they individuals or organizations 
– are shaped and framed to some, and sometimes to a great, extent by the national institutional 
systems those participants are originally or primarily connected with.  
 In turn, however, we have shown also that new transnational frames are likely to 
challenge, to confront and to change – even though slowly and incrementally – national 
institutional systems. They can do so through direct impact – what we call here ‘trickle-down’ 
effects or mechanisms. When European Union institutions or any other kind of transnational 
institution (e.g. the WTO, the IMF or the World Bank or the Biosafety Protocol) exert 
pressure directly at the national level on member governments to rewrite national laws or in 
more general terms to redefine national rules of the game, then we have what we call ‘trickle-
down’ effects or mechanisms. Illustrations of that type of mechanism can be found in a 
number of contributions to this volume, particularly in Part II. The impact can also be more 
indirect as documented in most chapters of Part I and in some chapters of Part II. Through 
cross-national interactions at subsocietal or meso levels – sectors, industries, professions or 
even from region to region – actors are being drawn into social spaces that extend well 
beyond their national context of origin. In that process, those actors are likely to be 
confronted with and to have to function within sets of rules that may be quite different from 
those of their country of origin. Subsocietal actors (firms and/or groups of individuals in 
Tainio et al., Kleiner, McKenna et al. or Midttun and Micola, firms and networks or 
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associations in Lilja and Moen or McNichol and Bensedrine, stock exchanges in Ventresca et 
al.) become the vectors and transmission belts through which those new rules are brought into 
a given national space. In certain circumstances, those subsocietal actors may be more than 
mere messengers. They may become real mediators. They may contribute indeed to pushing 
those new rules up towards the national institutional level, fostering in the process a 
transformation of the national business system or of the national business rationality. This 
path or pattern we associate with ‘trickle-up’ effects or mechanisms. 
 
 
Globalization as a process of institutional change 
 
After confronting and combining the empirical contributions to this book, we are able to make 
the following claim. The latest period of economic internationalization has created several 
paths and opportunities for the transformation of national institutional systems and rules of 
the economic game. National institutional systems are robust but in contrast to recent books 
that emphasise on the whole stability and self-reinforcing path-dependencies (Whitley 1999, 
Maurice and Sorge 2000, Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000, Hall and Soskice 2001) all contributions 
in this volume point towards change. The change we document can be quite significant but it 
appears to take place in more of an incremental than an abrupt or radical way. This book 
complements – and does not necessarily contradict – a literature on radical and abrupt 
changes following large-scale ruptures and crises most of which bears on Eastern Europe after 
1989 (Stark and Bruszt 1998, Elster et al. 1998, Kitschelt 1999, Jones-Luong 2001, Aslund 
2001 but see also Djelic 1998 on Western Europe after 1945). Even though it focuses on 
radical turning points in the life of a particular country, this literature indeed also points to 
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much less than clear-cut revolutions and to a fair degree instead of step-by-step adaptation, 
backlash or boomerang effects and partial hybridization.  
  The globalization story we tell in this book is thus a story of national institutional 
change – resistance and partial persistence being natural correlates (Djelic 1998). This story is 
one of incremental rather than abrupt and radical change, with nevertheless, we argue, quite 
consequential effects. A particular aim of this volume has been to provide evidence of and 
contribute to a better conceptualisation of the trickle-up and trickle-down trajectories through 
which national institutional systems are being transformed in co-evolution with a globalizing 
world economy.  
 
Incumbent versus Challenger rules 
 
All contributions to this volume start from the recognition that economic activity is embedded 
within a larger institutional frame (Weber 1978, Polanyi 1949, Granovetter 1985). The 
economic sociology literature that builds upon this idea of embeddedness has tended to 
underscore the historical significance of the national level in defining and shaping this 
institutional frame (e.g. D’Iribarne 1989, Fligstein 1990, Dobbin 1994, Whitley 1999, 
Maurice and Sorge 2000, Hall and Soskice 2001). The argument in that literature is that, at 
least in the modern age, the rules of the economic game have been essentially defined and 
shaped at the national level. Nation states and political institutions have traditionally played a 
key role in that process. And that process has often been intimately linked and correlated with 
state and nation building.  
Those historically dominant national frames or rules of the game we propose to call 
‘incumbent rules’, at least when they are considered from within their national system of 
origin. Most contributions to this volume document a still quite significant role and place in 
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today’s economic world for incumbent rules of the game. However, the presence and 
increasing role and significance of competing or ‘challenger rules’ is also one of our main 
collective findings. Globalization, we find, is about challenger rules of the economic game, 
challenger institutional frames colliding within a particular arena or space with nationally 
defined, incumbent rules.  
The contributions to this volume point to two main categories of challenger rules. 
Challenger rules can be the rules of the economic game from another national space – those 
challenger rules are themselves incumbent rules in their geographical context of origin. The 
chapters by Tainio et al., Kleiner or McKenna et al. look at the impact of this particular type 
of challenger rules. In all three cases, the challenger logic is the Anglo-Saxon if not the 
American one. Another category of challenger rules, particularly salient in Part II of the 
volume, are these rules with no particular or clear national origin that come to structure the 
transnational economic space. We look in greater details, in the section below, at the process 
through which those rules are being constituted, at what we call the process of institution 
building at the transnational level. The contributions by Lilja and Moen, Plehwe, Midttun and 
Micola, McNichol and Bensedrine, Ventresca et al. or Lehmkuhl all show that this particular 
category of challenger rules has come to play an increasingly significant role over the past 
fifty years, colliding regularly and sometimes violently with incumbent national institutional 
frames.  
 
A ‘stalactite’ model of change – incremental but consequential 
 
Work on national institutional systems or national business systems (D’Irbarne 1989, Dobbin 
1994, Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, Whitley 1999, Maurice and Sorge 2000, Hall and 
Soskice 2001) generally underscores the interdependence and close integration of institutional 
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elements within any single one of those national systems. A common argument in that 
tradition is that national systems are self-reinforcing and hence quite stable equilibria. The 
idea is that pressures at the level of certain institutional dimensions are likely to be neutralized 
and absorbed by the system as a whole, leaving little or no traces behind. The possibility of 
change is not ruled out but it appears quite unlikely in this framework since in fact for it to 
happen it seems that most if not all constitutive elements of the system would have to evolve 
or be transformed simultaneously. This indeed will be rare if not totally unlikely, including in 
situations of extreme shock or crisis or in the most acute of revolutionary episodes. As the 
experience of Germany after 1945 (Berghahn 1986, Schwartz 1991, Djelic 1998) or the more 
recent fate of Eastern European and Post Soviet countries (Stark and Bruszt 1998, Kitschelt 
1999, Jones-Luong 2001) show, blitz-type interventions, shock therapies or radical 
institutional reengineering are bound to encounter significant resistance and obstacles that are 
created in part by robust and enduring institutional configurations. They will generally have 
much less impact than anticipated and the persistence of preexisting patterns will be stronger 
than expected. Hence if change is defined as a radical and time bound overhaul of the system 
as a whole, we are indeed quite unlikely to see change.  
 Taken together, the contributions to this volume offer a somewhat different 
perspective on the issue of change. Our proposition is that the succession and combination, 
over a long period, of a series of incremental transformations could lead in the end to 
consequential and significant change. Each single one of these incremental transformations 
may appear quite marginal and even transparent – mitigated and partially absorbed as it is 
likely to be by the national institutional system as a whole. However, the succession and 
combination of multiple and multilevel transformations ultimately and with a longer term 
view of the process adds to the significance and heightens the impact of each single 
transformation. The image is that of a minuscule drop of water falling from the vault of a 
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cave. In itself, it seems totally insignificant with no impact whatsoever on the cave as a 
whole. However, under given conditions of temperature, the succession and combination of 
large numbers of droplets falling upon each other may lead to an aggregation of the calcite 
contained in those drops. After a (long) while the result will be the emergence of a thick 
landscape of innovatively shaped stalactites and stalagmites and a radical transformation, one 
could say, of the cave as a whole. 
 This image, we argue, is probably closer than the image of the ‘Big Bang’ to the way 
most national institutional systems change. National institutional configurations cannot 
dissolve and be replaced by others at the snap of fingers. Building on the empirical evidence 
collected for this book, we propose that under repeated, multidirectional and multilevel 
attacks from challenger rules, both through trickle-up and trickle-down trajectories, national 
configurations may erode and be reshaped progressively through time. Instead of all 
constitutive elements changing together at the very same time, the chapters collectively point 
to a process where one constitutive element after another might be weakened and destabilized. 
The weakness and destabilization of each constitutive element feeds on that of the others, 
leading in time to a system erosion – all elements ‘giving way’ or being transformed at least 
in part after a while. This, the chapters show, can be a very slow process where change is 
always associated with resistance and persistence. This, the chapters also show, may be 
happening at least as much in an indirect way as through direct assault on national 
institutional frames.  
 
Trickle-up trajectories 
Threats and challenges, we have argued above, may come from below, from subsocietal or 
subnational levels. The contributions to this volume point to two main scenarii for what we 
have called ‘trickle-up’ trajectories.  
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Scenarii and actors              
First, national actors crossing national borders may find that the rules of the game with which 
they are familiar come into collision and sometimes even are in contradiction with rules of the 
game dominant elsewhere. Those national actors could be individuals, groups of individuals, 
firms, associations or networks of firms as documented in Tainio et al., Kleiner, McKenna et 
al. or Lilja and Moen in this volume. This type of scenario will be all the more widespread 
that the internationalization of economic activities and of exchanges in general is becoming 
increasingly dense and intense.   
 The open nature of the economy may stimulate a second scenario that is parallel but 
goes the other direction. Foreign actors move into a given national space with rules of the 
game that are quite different from those of local actors (Tainio et al., Kleiner, McKenna et al. 
in this volume). A variant of that scenario is when the champions of challenger rules on the 
local or national scene are themselves locals or nationals who are pushing for new rules of the 
game in order to carve a space for themselves (Kleiner). What this is all about is the attempt 
by new or emerging actors, whether local outsiders or foreign entrants, to redefine rules of the 
game in an industry or impose ‘new’ ones in order to enter the field and the game and to 
reshape it to their advantage (Djelic and Ainamo 1999).  
The contributions in Part I and a few contributions in Part II show how this encounter 
between incumbent and challenger rules plays out at subsocietal levels, whether at the level of 
the firm (Tainio et al.), at the level of an industry (Lilja and Moen), an organizational field 
(Kleiner) or at the level of a profession (McKenna et al.). But those chapters also indicate that 
this interplay at the subsocietal level is not neutral for national institutions. Rules of the game 
may change at the subsocietal level well before this is institutionalized at the national level. 
But transformations at the subsocietal level may also reverberate in time at the national 
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institutional level. The recent decision by the German government to create a Kodex-
Kommission in charge of ‘modernizing the rules and practices of German capitalism’ is a 
clear case of such a process of post hoc ‘regularization’ (Le Monde, 7 November 2001). The 
object of this commission is to take stock of changes that have already redefined the German 
economic game and to institutionalize them at the national level. For some, this may be 
formally ringing the knell of Rhenan capitalism (Institut de l’Entreprise 2001). Drawing from 
and comparing the evidence presented in the empirical contributions to this volume, it is 
possible to identify the conditions in which contestation and transformation of incumbent 
rules of the game at the subsocietal level are likely to reflect and impact on the national level.  
 
Conditions for trickle-up trajectories 
One such condition seems to be the central position and overall leverage of the subsocietal 
actors concerned by or involved in the collision of rules. Changes within core and strategic 
firms or industries are more likely, ultimately, to have some impact on national level 
institutions. This appears to be particularly true in smaller countries as shown by the cases of 
Nokia in Finland (Tainio et al.) or of the forest industry in Norway and Finland (Lilja and 
Moen). In smaller countries, core firms or industries have proportionally more clout, strategic 
importance but also leverage which could explain their more direct impact.  
Other important conditions are the strength and legitimacy of those outsiders 
championing and pushing for challenger rules. In that respect, Anglo-Saxon players benefit 
from something akin to a ‘trademark’ advantage in professional fields such as corporate law 
or management consulting (McKenna et al.) as well as in other activities related to banking or 
financing (e.g. asset management, see Kleiner, or stock exchange related activities, see e.g. 
Tainio et al. and Ventresca et al.). This allows them to be more forceful and convincing in the 
promotion of their own sets of rules of the game.  
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Naturally, the strength and legitimacy of those outsiders and challengers will be more 
or less filtered and mitigated by the existence and embeddedness of local incumbent rules. 
Local appropriation will likely be more complex and contested in situations where incumbent 
rules already exist and are deeply embedded – to get back to the terms used in the 
introduction, when local institutional rules have already entered the phase of sedimentation. 
The case of the consulting profession for example shows that American actors had less 
trouble imposing their rules of the game in Finland than in France (McKenna et al. in this 
volume). Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the Finnish consulting space had barely 
been structured before they arrived and that it was still hovering between level 1 and level 2 
of institutionalization – between habitualization and objectification. A similar type of 
conclusion can be drawn from the description by Kleiner of the emergence of an asset 
management organizational field in France.  
Another condition seems important that is not unrelated to those identified above. The 
greater the shock or the more intense the collision, the more likely that it will reverberate at 
the national level. The collision will be more intense if subsocietal actors – firms, industries, 
professions or even possibly regions – lack protective buffers or else are in a situation of 
perceived and self-acknowledged crisis. The lack of protection can be due to the immaturity 
of the local field, as argued above for the consulting profession. It can be strategically 
engineered, either by political authorities or by the actors themselves, through deregulation 
for example or a lowering of trade or other protective barriers (Djelic and Ainamo 1999). It 
will also be related, naturally, to the strength of the push coming from outsiders and 
challenger rules. A perceived and self-acknowledged situation of crisis will tend to 
correspond, on the other hand, to a high degree of dissatisfaction with incumbent rules, either 
because these rules do not seem to coevolve with environmental conditions and/or because 
they narrow the opportunities of local and incumbent actors in a changing world.  
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Trickle-up trajectories and mechanisms 
We argue that under these conditions – or a subset thereof – transformations in rules of the 
game that were initially happening at a subsocietal level are likely to have an impact and 
reverberate, after a while, at the national level. Building on the empirical contributions to this 
volume, particularly in Part I, we now turn to the mechanisms allowing reverberation or 
‘trickle-up’ trajectories. The chapters in Part I point to three main categories of mechanisms 
and we use here DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) terminology.  
The first category of mechanisms we label ‘coercive’. They correspond to the situation 
where the subsocietal actors concerned have enough clout and power in the local space to 
push for a more widespread adoption of those changes initially happening at their level. 
Amongst coercive mechanisms, one finds direct political action and lobbying through existing 
institutional channels or social networks. Another path, somewhat more indirect, is through 
the pressure put by key actors, initially in the cyclone’s eye, on their local interlocutors – 
competitors, clients, suppliers, trade unions, providers of education or financial institutions – 
to appropriate some if not all the changes they have themselves gone through. Such pressure 
is possible when those key actors have economic or social leverage over their interlocutors 
reflecting either situations of dependence and/or tight networking arrangements. A building 
up and aggregation of multiple micro changes through such a process is likely to lead to a de 
facto situation where preexisting incumbent rules of the game have been changed or replaced 
even before the legislator or political institutions get involved. The contributions by Tainio et 
al., Lilja and Moen or Kleiner point to the role of such coercive mechanisms along the trickle-
up trajectories.  
A second category of mechanisms we label ‘mimetic’, following once again DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) terminology. What takes place in this case is essentially a process of 
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spread and diffusion through imitation. The combination of multiple acts of imitation at the 
subsocietal level can here again create a de facto situation where the rules of the game have 
changed well before this is being acknowledged, officialized and institutionalised at the 
national level. Mimetic mechanisms can be identified in the contributions by Tainio et al., 
McKenna et al. or Lilja and Moen. At the same time, those chapters show that it is often 
difficult to decouple coercive from mimetic types of mechanisms, the two being closely tied 
up and interconnected and shaping in interaction trickle-up trajectories.  
Finally, evidence from Part I points to a third category of mechanisms, the impact of 
which is probably slower and more difficult to trace. This category we label ‘normative’. It 
covers and encompasses processes by which outsiders are able to socialize a number of local 
actors into their own ‘challenger’ rules of the game – the cognitive or ideational dimension 
here becoming key. This is clearly illustrated in contributions by Tainio et al., McKenna et al 
or Kleiner. The ‘maximization of shareholder value’, the ‘boardroom professional counsel’ or 
the ‘independent asset management firm’ become appropriated through time as cognitive 
frames by local actors and are neutralized in the process. Appropriation means that their 
origins and initial context of embeddedness are all but forgotten – hence a neutralization. 
These cognitive frames may even in fact become transparent to the actors who have 
appropriated them. In time, the organizations and institutions supporting those cognitive 
frames emerge and are being structured locally – either ex nihilo or through transformation of 
the preexisting structuring field. This process of normative integration or normalisation can be 
greatly furthered in any particular national context if challenger rules find a relay in local 
institutions of socialisation such as professional schools or universities. This clearly was the 
case in both the consulting and ‘maximisation of shareholder value’ stories where local 
business education systems proved to be powerful relays (Tainio et al., McKenna et al.) 
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To sum up, we bring together in table 1 the defining features of what we called trickle-
up trajectories.  
Table 1 about here 
 
Thus, national institutional systems may come under pressure from below and be affected by 
transformations of the rules of the game at the subnational or subsocietal level. Challenge, it 
seems may however also come from above, from the transnational level. We will get back in 
the next section to the process of construction and stabilisation of transnational rules of the 
game. But we will now look at how those transnational rules are bound to create challenges 
for incumbent national institutional systems. 
 
Trickle-down trajectories 
 
With respect to the influence of transnational rules on national systems, contributions in Part 
II of this book point to two main scenarii. 
  
 Scenarii and actors 
First, the challenge may come from transnational organizations or supranational 
constructions. A characteristic of our world since the end of World War II has been the 
emergence, multiplication and stabilisation of such organizations and constructions in the 
transnational space (Whitley this volume, Meyer et al. 1997). Those organizations and 
constructions quite often turn out to be rule-making bodies and some of them have gained 
significant and direct influence over national polities. This is clearly and particularly the case 
with the European Union as illustrated in the contributions by Lilja and Moen, Plehwe or 
Midttun and Micola. With respect to the economic realm, other supranational organizations 
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such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) should be 
mentioned. These organizations nurture and contribute to the diffusion of particular rules of 
the game, which are likely to collide with incumbent rules or practices in any given national 
space. The collision can be particularly violent and intense in weaker countries or in countries 
going through an acute internal crisis such as in the Eastern part of the European continent 
(e.g. Stiglitz and Muet 2001, Stiglitz 2002, Rodrick 2002). The challenge created by those 
transnational organizations and supranational institutions for national rules of the game has 
started to be studied over the recent years. The impact of the European Union, in particular, 
has been the object of an increasing number of studies (Leibfried and Pierson 1995, Sandholtz 
and Stone Sweet 1998, Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996).  
 There is less attention being paid to a second type of scenario where challenger rules 
emerge from a less structured and hence less visible transnational space.  The contributions by 
McNichol and Bensedrine, Ventresca et al. or Lehmkuhl all show that rule setting and rule 
making take place also in transnational fields or arenas lacking structuration in relative terms. 
Actors – all kinds of actors, from private firms to consumers, lobbies, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) or state representatives – come together to negotiate and agree on rules 
of the game. This is illustrated by McNichol and Bensedrine for environmental issues, by 
Ventresca et al. for financial markets and by Lehmkuhl for the arbitration of conflicts in 
transnational trade. Those rules of the game are institutions, in the sense we have used in this 
volume, to the extent that they structure action and economic activity. A comparison between 
those chapters seems to show furthermore that, for the most part, those are cognitive and 
normative institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The rules that emerge or are negotiated in 
that context are essentially norms that are enacted, appropriated and enforced by the actors 
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themselves. The structural apparatus – formal organization, legislation or coercive machinery 
– comes if at all in support of those norms.  
 
Conditions for trickle-down trajectories 
Beyond this difference in scenario, all contributions in Part II point to trickle-down 
trajectories where the construction and stabilisation of transnational rules is not neutral for 
national institutions. From a comparison of these contributions, we draw a number of 
conclusions as to the conditions in which transnational challenger rules may come to indeed 
trickle-down to the national level with a potentially significant impact upon incumbent 
national rules of the game. One important variable appears to be the degree of centrality of a 
particular country, through its private and public representatives, in the process of 
construction and stabilisation of transnational rules. Building on contributions in Part II of this 
book, it seems fair to differentiate between at least three main groups of countries in that 
respect.  
 The first group is a little peculiar; it is a one unit sample. In the genetically modified 
foods (McNichol and Bensedrine), financial markets (Ventresca et al.) or commercial 
arbitration (Lehmkuhl) stories, the United States plays a unique role. An explanation to that 
special place and role lies in the unique position of geopolitical dominance that characterizes 
the US after 1945 (Djelic 1998 and Whitley in this volume). Through its private and public 
representatives, that country is guiding and structuring the process of construction and 
stabilisation of transnational rules in a more or less direct and visible manner. The US does 
not always manage to impose the solution that will best serve its interests as McNichol and 
Bensedrine show in their contribution but the role of that country in the process of 
transnational rule building has no equivalent. A second group is made up of a few core (and 
rather rich) countries, which are proactive and quite involved in trying to shape the process. 
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The third group finally is the larger one and brings together those countries with a more 
passive connection to the process.  
 From comparing the contributions in Part II, we come to the following observations, 
some of which should be further tested. Most of the time, the US is highly central to the 
process of transnational institution building. Ultimately, however, it seems that the level of 
compliance of that country to the transnational rules that emerge is irregular and changing 
(McNichol and Bensedrine this volume, see also Djelic and Bensedrine 2001). The profound 
geopolitical imbalance in favour of the US increases the degrees of freedom of that country 
regarding compliance with transnational rules although it may have played a significant role 
in the process of construction and elaboration of those rules. The recent change of heart of the 
US on the Kyoto Protocol is in that respect an interesting case. In 1997, 39 industrialized 
countries including the US had agreed in Kyoto, Japan, to cut emissions of six greenhouse 
gases to 5.2% below the 1990 level and this by 2008-2012. On March 28, 2001, the US 
announced that it was pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol. Christie Todd Whitman, head of the 
US Environment Protection Agency announced: ’We have no interest in implementing that 
treaty’ (ENS 2001).  
 In the second group of countries identified above – rich core countries – compliance 
appears to be more regular once the rules have been agreed upon. In the last group of 
countries, those that are more passive in the process of transnational institution building, 
appropriation may be more of an issue. The process will likely be slower with a greater 
distance between the world of discourse and formal institutions and the world of action and 
practice that will remain very much structured by traditional patterns.  
 Without going too far in drawing conclusions at that stage, these observations would 
lead us to propose that the more reliable and stable driver of transnational institution building 
may in fact be the second group of countries – made up of rich and core countries with the EU 
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at the centre. If the governance of globalization calls for a systematization of transnational 
institution building, then we should look – and hope – for leadership for that process in that 
second group as a collective. Relying on the US, as has tended to be the case throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, may in fact not be an optimal strategy. 
 Other variables with an impact on trickle-down trajectories are the nature of 
incumbent rules and the degree of dependence of a particular country on external players. A 
country where local rules are weak, either because they lack legitimacy, have proven 
inefficient or a hindrance, are altogether absent or still at a pre-institutionalization stage as 
defined in the introduction to this volume, creates more space for rules constructed at a 
transnational level to trickle-down. This can only be reinforced in situations of dependence, 
where a country for example sees the granting of financial assistance it badly needs being 
conditioned upon compliance to a set of transnationally defined rules. This is not, after 
reflection, in contradiction with our precedent finding. Weak countries tend to belong to the 
group we have defined above as ‘passive’. Weakness and dependence may compensate in part 
for passivity, which might lead to more rapid formal compliance than expected. Quite often, 
however, a significant gap will remain between the world of discourse and formal institutions 
on the one hand and the world of practice on the other (this finds confirmation in earlier work 
by sociologists of global society, e.g. Meyer et al. 1997a, Meyer et al. 1997b, Boli and 
Thomas 1999, Meyer and Ramirez 2000). The former might indeed be affected through a 
trickle-down trajectory by transnational challenger rules. The latter will tend to stay, at least 
for a while, embedded in local traditions and national institutional legacies. A special and 
quite different case of dependence should be added and mentioned here. Direct political 
dependence of national countries on a supranational construction, such as is the case in the 
European Union context, is an obvious path for trickle-down mechanisms. This situation 
naturally creates conditions where the rules defined at the supranational level are likely indeed 
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to have a rapid and significant impact at the national level (Lilja and Moen, Plehwe, Midttun 
and Micola in this volume).   
 
 Trickle-down trajectories and mechanisms 
We now turn to the set of mechanisms that appear to be at work along what we have called 
here trickle-down trajectories. Chapters in Part II point to three main categories of 
mechanisms, parallel to the three categories identified for trickle-up trajectories. The first 
category is the coercive one. Within this category we find the granting of financial, or as a 
matter of fact any form of assistance conditioned upon compliance to a set of transnationally 
defined rules of the game. Other coercive mechanisms, in the context in particular of 
supranational constructions such as the European Union, are political fiat, laws and decrees 
backed up by an enforcement apparatus. The mimetic category for this particular trajectory 
turns out to be even harder to disentangle and decouple from either the coercive or normative 
ones. Mimetic mechanisms in that case have to do with the voluntary adoption by a particular 
country of challenger rules of the game. This voluntary adoption, though, might sometimes be 
reflecting longer term objectives – as for example with the case of Eastern European countries 
adopting European Union compatible sets of rules, just in case of and in order to be ready for 
future integration. Voluntary adoption may also be motivated by a conviction that adopted 
rules are indeed ‘superior’.  
 The third category of mechanisms at work, finally, is the one we have labelled before 
normative. What we see, from the empirical evidence provided in Part II, are multiple and 
parallel processes of professionalization at the transnational level. Individuals and 
organizations are joining in, across and beyond national boundaries, around common 
preoccupations, goals or values and beliefs. They take it upon themselves to elaborate a set of 
norms and institutions in the sense of rules of the game. They virtually become, in the process 
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a transnational community (Morgan 2001) and, as such, they get actively involved in trying to 
push those common norms and rules down towards the national or even subnational levels. 
Here again, this type of mechanism is being reinforced by a worldwide process of 
standardisation of institutions of socialisation – whether schools, universities or the media in 
the wide sense of the term (Meyer et al. 1992, Meyer and Ramirez 2000, Byrkjeflot 2000, 
Amdam 2002).  
 In Table 2 below, we summarize the main features of what we have called here 
trickle-down trajectories.  
Table 2 about here 
 
An important issue addressed in this volume has thus been how the transnational affects the 
local, and more particularly how the transnational may affect a nationally defined institutional 
constellation or system. One of the findings drawn from our collective endeavour has had to 
do with the nature of national institutional change. National institutional systems are changing 
quite significantly and enduringly, we argue, through a multiplicity and an aggregation of 
slow and incremental steps. We have identified two main types of trajectories – trickle-up and 
trickle-down – along which the transnational can effect, potentially in a quite significant way, 
a national institutional equilibrium or constellation. We see the combination of trickle-up and 
trickle-down trajectories, their mutual reinforcement and the incremental but significant 
institutional re-configuration they trigger through time, as an important and constitutive 
dimension of globalization.  
 This, however, is only one side of the story told in this book. At the same time that 
they look at how the transnational affects the local and the national, contributions to this 
volume also provide an understanding of how the local or the national shape the transnational. 
The transnational space, in our collective approach, is neither taken for granted nor treated as 
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anomic or unstructured. Rather, it emerges as an institutionalized arena in its own right. As 
Whitley argues in this volume and as others have systematically documented (e.g. Meyer et 
al. 1997a, Meyer et al. 1997b) the structuration of that arena has made significant progress 
during the second part of the twentieth century. Such structuration has implied and concretely 
meant, we collectively argue, a process of institution building. And transnational institution 
building, we find, has often started from the local and the national or from the ‘rubbing 
against each other’ of multiple locals or nationals.  
 
 
Globalization as institution building 
 
Collectively, the contributions to this volume provide evidence in fact of coevolution between 
the national and the transnational. A transnational rule or system of rules that is an offshoot of 
a local or national model or results from the interplay between multiple locals or national 
models may in time, in its own right and through either trickle-up or trickle-down trajectories, 
come to affect and impact local or national institutional arrangements. Time, here, is an 
important dimension. And so are, as argued above, a number of conditions that will either 
facilitate or constrain the process. A few chapters explicitly point to the circularity and self-
reinforcing dimension of this process through time (McKenna et al., Whitley, McNichol and 
Bensedrine). The others are more implicit about the diachronic interplay and present 
snapshots at particular points in time.  
 
Institution building: scenarii and actors 
 
 Transnational organizations 
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A first and obvious scenario historically for institution building in the transnational space has 
been the formal setting up of a transnational organization. This organization takes over a 
particular sphere or domain where cross-national interactions are significant and attempts to 
achieve its structuration through rule making and institution building. This, naturally, is an old 
scenario and with a little bit of a stretch the Roman Catholic Church could be used as an 
illustration, and a successful one at that. 
 Without going that far back in history and staying with transnational organizations that 
have been set up in the modern era, in the age of the nation state, a number of other examples 
come to mind. The League of Nations was an important ancestor, although with ultimately 
little impact (Murray 1987, Knock 1995). The International Labour Organization is less 
known but it is also worth mentioning as a transnational organization created in the interwar 
period and being revived in 1948. In the few years following 1945, the project of structuring 
the transnational space regained significance after nearly two decades of strong nationalism 
and protectionism. In this postwar project, the transnational organization was undeniably the 
predominant scenario. The United Nations and its various divisions, the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC later to become the OECD), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT, later to become the World Trade Organization) all proceeded from the same logic – 
although the GATT or WTO may have turned out to be more of an hybrid between this first 
scenario and the third one to be described below.  
 These organizations all had a centralized core, in charge of setting the rules and 
building institutions at a transnational level. And this centralized core was the direct reflection 
of the interests of national member states – naturally in varying mixes in each case. In other 
words, the attempt at rule making and institution building in the transnational space was very 
much controlled, through these organizations, by public or semi-public types of actors – 
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representatives of particular national governments and polities. In that context, such 
transnational organizations were in fact little more than the tools of particular nation states 
and governments, mirroring at any one point in time the existing geopolitical balance of 
power. These types of transnational organizations have been more or less successful in their 
attempt at setting the rules of the game on a transnational scale. The more successful – the 
IMF, the World Bank and probably also the GATT or later the WTO – have been those with 
some control over compliance. Control could stem from a degree of dependence of member 
states on the transnational organizations as well as from the ability of these organizations to 
associate rewards with compliance and sanctions with non compliance.  
 
 Supranational constructions 
A second scenario, historically, for institution building in the transnational space has come 
through the temptation to create a supranational market, or even a supranational state or 
nation. With a little bit of a stretch, once again, and some degree of historical anachronism 
since a number of them were constituted before the emergence of the nation state, empires are 
the materialisation of such a temptation. In our modern age, the most obvious illustrations of 
this second scenario are constructions such as the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Union. There are signs 
that NAFTA may also be travelling that road.  
 Here again, the process of rule setting and institution building stems from a political, 
top-down kind of initiative. Public or semi-public actors, governments or their representatives 
are instrumental in that process even though they may not always be as predominant as in the 
first scenario. The scope of those centrally engineered constructions goes well beyond, in 
general, what transnational organizations of the first type could do. The new rules and 
institutions are enforceable, in the sense of them being formally and efficiently associated 
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with enforcement mechanisms that put member states under strong pressure to comply. In 
fact, the reality and strength of enforcement mechanisms combined with the scope of the 
domain controlled might be the key differentiating features between this type of supranational 
constructions and transnational organizations.  
 Several chapters in this book focus explicitly on institution building in the context of 
supranational constructions. The contributions by Lilja and Moen, Plehwe or Midttun and 
Micola tell of the emergence of new rules of the game within the European Community or 
European Union space. They also show how these changes in rules of the game that are being 
initiated at the supranational level are then having an impact on national institutional 
configurations. This impact can be felt through trickle-up trajectories, where private and 
subsocietal actors change their behaviours and push these changes up towards their own 
national environments. The chapter by Lilja and Moen illustrates that, where an understanding 
of competition defined at the European Union level is transforming interactions in the 
Norwegian and Finnish forest industries and challenging, in the process, rules of the 
competitive game as they had until then been defined in these two countries.  
 The impact can also be felt through trickle-down trajectories, as documented in the 
chapters by Plehwe or Midttun and Micola. The process there is one where the supranational 
level imposes new rules of the game on national member states. And the path is from 
supranational authorities to national governments or political institutions. National 
governments and political institutions have in turn to push down and translate those 
supranational rules within their own national space, putting pressure in the process on actors 
at the subsocietal level to change their behaviours and ways of functioning. Both 
contributions clearly show that this trickling-down of new rules of the game is challenging 
national institutional configurations, leading to potentially quite significant transformations at 
that level. The trickle-down trajectory documented in these two contributions is made 
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possible by the existence of enforcement mechanisms. A supranational construction such as 
the European Union is indeed characterised by the strength of enforcement mechanisms and 
thus by its potential clout and impact over member nations and states. One type of 
enforcement mechanisms are direct controls associated positively with rewards and negatively 
with sanctions. Another type of enforcement mechanism is the reliance on voluntary 
compliance where member states are aware of the overall benefits they draw from belonging 
to the supranational construction and, conversely, realize the dangerous consequences of not 
respecting the terms of a contract they entered of their own will.  
 
 Self-disciplining transnational communities 
We now turn to a third scenario for institution building in the transnational space, which, we 
argue, is progressively becoming more widespread. In this third scenario, all actors concerned 
by a particular type of transnational activity come together, generally in non structured and 
little formalised settings, to elaborate and agree upon collective rules of the game. Little is 
known on transnational rule making in such a context (but see Engwall and Morgan 1999, 
Djelic and Bensedrine 2001) and three chapters in this book – those by McNichol and 
Bensedrine, Ventresca et al. or Lehmkuhl – contribute to a better understanding of that 
process. In contrast to the first two scenarii, public or semi-public actors might be involved in 
rule setting but they are not the only ones. In fact, as documented in all three contributions, 
private actors might take the initiative and be quite instrumental for the elaboration of rules 
and the building of institutions as well as for monitoring compliance.  
 Another difference with the two previous scenarii is that the logic at work is not one of 
external control but rather one of self-disciplining. Instead of waiting for public actors to 
impose an institutional frame and thus orient private action, the actors concerned and in 
particular non governmental and private actors, take the initiative and set their own rules. 
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Within an arena or a field of transnational activity lacking initially in structuration, all 
concerned actors collaborate in building institutional arrangements that will constrain their 
own actions, behaviours and interactions. The process is one of voluntary and relatively 
informal negotiations. A striking common finding, emerging from the contributions by 
McNichol and Bensedrine, Ventresca et al. or Lehmkuhl, is the relatively amorphous, fluid 
and multifocal nature of that process as well as of any kind of emerging structural 
arrangements.  
 A comparison of the chapters by McNichol and Bensedrine, Ventresca et al. and 
Lehmkuhl shows reliance on two main categories of enforcement mechanisms. One is 
voluntary compliance, but compliance this time not only of national states and governments 
but also directly of all actors involved in the process. Compliance is voluntary for the main 
reason that these actors define themselves the rules and inflict upon themselves the 
institutional constraints that will bound their own actions and interactions. From the empirical 
material, a second enforcement mechanism, socialization, can be identified – although 
probably more as a potential and an objective than as an already existing and concrete reality. 
Indeed, socialization can only emerge as an enforcement mechanism in a later stage. Rules 
and institutions have to be constructed and agreed upon (the habitualization or pre-
institutionalization stage identified in the introduction to this volume), actors have to function 
within that frame for a while (codification), before the double process of socialization and 
self-reproduction through socialization can really become operative (sedimentation). The 
advantage of socialization as an enforcement mechanism is the decreasing need for direct 
controls, and thus for both external rewards and sanctions. Actors that are being socialized 
through a particular institutional frame or in a particular set of rules become their own 
watchdogs. Ultimately, the institutional frame and the set of rules should ‘disappear’, to the 
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extent that, after a while, they have a tendency to become neutral and transparent for those 
actors that function within the space they structure.  
 This third scenario for institution building at a transnational level is not new. As 
argued in the chapter by Lehmkuhl, for example, the structuring of commercial arbitration at 
the transnational level by actors themselves – and in particular by private actors – has existed 
for a long time. One could also argue that international cartels, particularly during the 
interwar period but even after in some industries (Lilja and Moen this volume), fit within this 
type of scenario. The contemporary period of globalization, however, has been marked by an 
intensification of institution building at the transnational level (Whitley, this volume). And in 
the context of that intensification, we argue that this third scenario has become progressively 
more important particularly in recent years. Overall, a comparison of the various contributions 
to this book seem to show an historical evolution since 1945 in terms of which scenario has 
been predominant.  
 The early period, in the years following the war, was characterized by the 
multiplication of transnational organizations. Then came the time of supranational 
constructions – particularly in Western Europe. This, naturally, is still going on and quite 
strongly in fact as the chapters by Lilja and Moen, Middtun and Micola or Phlewe show. At 
the same time, the empirical evidence in the very last part of this book points for the recent 
period in the direction of an increasing role and place for self-disciplining transnational 
communities (see also Brunsson 2001). Professions are one particular type of such 
communities but, as the last chapters in this book indicate, they are far from the only one.  
  
Institution building: mode and nature of the process 
In parallel to these three different scenarii, the chapters in this book also point to different 
modes for the process of transnational institution building.  
32  
   
 Dominant mode 
A first, obvious mode we label here ‘dominant’. In that mode, the building of institutions at a 
transnational level simply reflects one dominant local or national model. The rules 
characteristic of one particular national space thus shape in a rather direct way the 
transnational space. In a second stage, this local turned transnational model is bound to have 
an impact on a number of other national institutional configurations. The latter are indeed 
being affected, to a greater or lesser extent, by transnational institutions and rules both 
through trickle-up and trickle-down trajectories as we have argued above.  
 This overall process generally reflects the objective and/or perceived strength of the 
‘dominant’ nation, which itself depends on a combination of economic, military and 
geopolitical factors with some degree of ideological propping up. Quite a few of the 
contributions to this volume show that the United States has played the role of dominant 
model during the second half of the twentieth century. The chapters by Tainio et al., Kleiner, 
McKenna et al. or Whitley do provide evidence of such a dominant mode or logic being at 
work in the process of transnational institution building, with a significant impact ultimately 
upon dependent or peripheral national institutional configurations. In most of those chapters 
in fact, the term ‘Americanization’ appears to fit better with the stories told than the 
apparently more neutral word ‘globalization’.  
 
 Negotiated mode 
A second mode emerging from the contributions to this volume we label the ‘negotiated’ 
mode. Institution building in the transnational space can come about through the 
confrontation or ‘rubbing against each other’ of multiple locals or nationals, leading to what 
can be described as a process of negotiation. The chapters by Plehwe, Midttun and Micola or 
McNichol and Bensedrine or Ventresca et al. provide illustrations of that particular mode. In 
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the contributions by McNichol and Bensedrine or Ventresca et al., though, what we see is in 
fact the interplay between the ‘negotiated’ and the ‘dominant’ mode. All participants to the 
negotiation are not created equal in that case and one of them – the United States – looms 
significantly larger than the others in the process. This underscores the ideal typical nature of 
the different modes we identify and the likelihood that they will coexist and interact in real 
life contexts.  
 While situations of negotiation are rarely perfectly balanced, a situation of dominance 
on the other hand is rarely so extreme as to leave no space for at least partial negotiation. In 
the context of what was described above as ‘Americanization’, for example, what the chapters 
by Tainio et al. and McKenna et al. documented was in fact both the transformation of a 
national model – the American one – into a transnational one and the partial alteration, 
translation and negotiation of that model when it came into contact with previously existing 
and established national institutional configurations (see also Djelic 1998). 
 
 Emerging mode 
The contributions to this volume allow us to identify a third mode, although more as an 
overall trend and as a potential than as a really operative – at least as yet – mode of building 
transnational institutions. We label this third mode ‘emergent’. Common to illustrations of 
both the ‘dominant’ and ‘negotiated’ modes is the fact that the actors involved – whoever and 
whatever they are – remain strongly embedded in and shaped by the institutional contexts of 
their home countries. These actors tend in fact to extend the actions and strategies used in that 
context and shaped by it to the transnational arena (Whitley this volume and 2001). What 
some of the contributions to this volume seem to show is that this is not necessarily always 
the case.  
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 The chapters by Plehwe, McNichol and Bensedrine, Ventresca et al. or Lehmkuhl for 
example point to a blurring of identities – particularly national ones – amongst those actors 
involved in transnational institution building. Once transnational arenas have been structured 
for a little while, once transnational institutions and rules of the game shape behaviours and 
interactions, some of the actors concerned come to be more directly affected by these 
transnational institutions than by the institutions of the country they may originate from. The 
structures, strategies and even identities of these actors change, sometimes quite significantly, 
generally through the interplay between the national rules of the game of the country they 
come from and the transnational system that is being constructed. New actors may also sprout 
up and the only referent for these new actors will be the embryonic transnational institutional 
context in which they were born (e.g. some transnational NGOs, lobbying organizations 
created at the European level, see Salk et al. 2001).  
 Any further process of transnational institution building in that context cannot 
anymore fit under the categories of either the ‘dominant’ or the ‘negotiated’ mode. What 
takes place then is what we label, for lack of a better word, an emergent process. Multiple 
actors with no clear identities and functioning themselves at the interface of multiple rule 
systems, come in collision with each other. If we are to follow the metaphorical use of chaos 
theory in social sciences, the result in this case is bound to be unpredictable (Thietart and 
Forgues 1997). We call this result an ‘emergent’ construction.  
 The three modes identified here are clearly ideal types. There is bound to be, in other 
words, an interaction and an interplay between them in real life situations. At the same time, 
the chapters in this volume appear to document, collectively, a shift over time in their relative 
importance as a mode of transnational institution building. This shift parallels to quite a 
degree the evolution, in terms of scenario, that was identified above. In the immediate post-
World War II years, we have argued, the main scenario for transnational institution building 
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was the setting up of transnational organisations. During this period, the dominant mode – one 
national model, the American one, imposing itself on a transnational scale – was all but 
overwhelming. The dominant mode has not entirely disappeared with the attempts at 
supranational construction. But such projects, by their very nature, meant and required some 
degree of negotiation between the several member nations that were shaping them, generally 
on a world regional basis. Finally, the move towards the third scenario – transnational 
institution building by self-disciplining transnational communities – coincides quite closely 
with the slow assertion of an emergent mode. It seems furthermore to fit particularly with 
transnational institution building across world regions – in what gets close to being a ‘global’ 
space.                                       
 Table 3 presents in summary form the variants of transnational institution building 
identified in this section.  
Table 3 about here 
 
 
Outcomes and final reflections 
 
Globalization can be read as a double process of institutional change – at the national level – 
and institution building – in the transnational arena. As such, it emerges as a complex 
aggregation and constellation of multiple layers, each of which has to be contextualized, 
reflects particular contingencies and exhibits unique path dependencies. Behind this first level 
of extreme complexity, this volume has allowed us to point to a limited number of important 
patterns.  
 First, what clearly comes out of our collective findings is that globalization is in fact a 
world beyond convergence and divergence. And we could add that it is so in a structural way 
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at least in the foreseeable future. The treatment of globalization layer by layer, facet by facet 
and dimension by dimension destroys the myth of clearcut convergence but we document in 
some cases multiple local reinterpretations of a ‘dominant’ model or a common set of 
challenger rules (e.g. Tainio et al., Kleiner, McKenna et al.). Still, although we do not 
document full convergence, we move away from the vision of stable systemic national models 
(Whitley 1999, Maurice and Sorge 2000, Hall and Soskice 2001). We point instead to 
significant change affecting national institutional systems – what we call incremental but 
consequential change. Globalization is disrupting, we argue, the systemic stability and relative 
autonomy of national spaces. It is pushing along common logics and institutional rules of the 
game that coexist, compete, hybridize with or even replace incumbent national institutions. 
 Institutional rules of the game can be essentially of two kinds – structural and 
normative or ideational. We find that globalization is associated there with two main 
tendencies. First, a number of contributions in this volume document a significant 
intensification and the greater density of institutional rules in general. A second tendency 
seems to be the increasing importance and role, proportionally, of normative or ideational 
types of rules over more structural ones. This double tendency reflects both the 
demultiplication of levels at which rules are being produced – local, national, supranational 
(e.g. Europe) or global. It also reflects an explosion of and rising competition between centres 
and actors of rule production.  
 The traditional landscape – characteristic of modern world society – was one where 
relatively isolated and independent nation states set the rules of the game that applied within 
their borders and had the coercive means to enforce them. The space in between remained 
relatively anomic. With respect to rule production, this volume points to a rather different 
story today. The landscape is one of loose and fluid but quite dense networks of ‘actors’ in the 
wide sense of the term, whether public, private or mixed, whether local, national, 
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supranational or global, that compete and sometimes cooperate for the production of 
institutional rules. Many of those ‘actors’ do not have physical control over any form of 
territory. Some of them are in fact closer to being transnational or even virtual communities 
(Kogut 2002). Hence, instead of relying on coercion and external forms of control, the 
tendency there is to expect and foster socialization and the internalization of norms, self-
discipline and peer regulation. 
 We would, naturally, benefit from having a much greater density of empirical building 
blocks of the type exemplified by the contributions to this book. It would, in particular, be 
interesting to move away from an overwhelming focus on traditional core countries and to 
observe the interactions of processes of institutional change and institution buildings in other 
parts of the world. However, we can nevertheless propose the following tentative conclusion. 
Globalization may be contributing to bringing about a radical change in the meaning of 
governance – reducing the importance of traditional coercive, external and centralized state 
power and increasing that of decentralized norm producing and self-regulating communities. 
Governance becomes less associated with downstream and external control, relying on 
coercion and repression. It becomes increasingly associated with upstream definition, 
voluntary adhesion to and appropriation of norms, policed by the risks of exclusion.  
 This second meaning of governance may be the only one available and acceptable 
within the transnational space. In that respect, calls for a world government do seem highly 
utopian and far fetched at least in the medium term (see e.g. Rodrick 2001). Interestingly, 
contributions to this volume seem to show that this particular meaning of governance is also 
making significant inroads in regional supranational constructions such as the European 
Union or even within nation states. Globalization is not threatening governance – in fact we 
argue that globalization reflects a particular type of governance. However, what globalization 
may be doing is introducing within national polities and democratic arenas this second 
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understanding of governance that can both coexist and compete with traditional state control. 
Globalization does not mean ‘governance without governments’ (Rosenau and Czempiel 
1992) – it probably means however a partial reinvention and transformation of the role and 
place of governments in governance. As we have shown in this volume, this is naturally the 
case transnationally where nation states have to contend with each other as well as with many 
other actors for both the structuration and the monitoring of governing institutions. This is 
also the case nationally we propose, with probably an important evolution to be confirmed in 
the coming years of national democratic landscapes that will come increasingly to incorporate 
logics of governance of the second type.  
 Through that reflection we suggest that the debates around globalization and its 
governance have to be somewhat reformulated. The dilemma is not between globalization and 
governance. The dilemma rather is between two different meanings of governance and the 
balance that should be reached between them. On the one hand, governance of the 
Westphalian or state control type has the advantage of being something that we are familiar 
with and that we can easily recognize. It is also both blunt and clear when it comes to the 
democratic game. In simplistic terms, it creates a separation between a government that makes 
the rules and civil society to which they apply (even though naturally governments are 
supposed to be direct representatives of civil society and the rules apply also in theory to 
governments and their members). The main shortcoming of the state control form or logic of 
governance is that it is tightly associated in its workings with a repressive apparatus that itself 
functions on a bounded territory. Hence it is difficult to extend that logic beyond the nation 
state – the European Union is a good laboratory to test this difficulty.  
 Governance of the community type, on the other hand, has the great advantage of 
potentially knowing no boundaries. It should be noted also that since it relies on voluntary 
adhesion rather than coercion it is less violent and probably less costly as a form of 
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governance. On the other hand, this type of governance is associated with a rather different 
conception of the democratic game – more in line with Tocqueville’s depiction of early 
America where civil society is much more directly active in rule building and enforcement 
through collective or organizational representatives (Tocqueville 1951). An issue with this 
type of democratic game, that comes out quite clearly in the last chapters of this volume, is its 
blurred, fuzzy and sometimes messy nature. While it brings many of the actors concerned 
around the table of negotiation, this type of democratic process does not ensure far from it 
that all actors are being created equal. The contributions by Lilja and Moen, Plehwe, 
McNichol and Bensedrine or Lehmkuhl point to significant power plays and imbalances 
behind what could appear at first sight to be egalitarian and neutral processes. What does not 
appear in those contributions and should be mentioned here is the total or partial exclusion of 
those groups, actors, nations, communities that either do not understand the change in game 
and rules of the game or else have not prepared or geared up to getting ready to play it. One 
obvious absence is that of labour and its representatives. It is clearly not the only one. 
 This reflection may contribute to explaining both the virulence of the anti-
globalization movement and its repeated calls for governance. We have argued in this volume 
that globalization is in fact about governance and negotiations around governance but the 
anti-globalization movement may be witness to the de facto exclusion from these negotiations 
of groups that neither play the game nor in fact know about its rules. 
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Figure 1: National institutional change and transnational institution building: the 
interplay 
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Table 1 : Trickle-up Trajectories 
Scenarii and Actors Conditions Mechanisms 
• Local actors extending 
abroad 
• Foreign actors coming in 
• Local outsiders trying to 
redefine the game in order 
to enter it 
 
 
• Power and centrality of 
those national actors who 
are first movers in 
adopting challenger rules 
• Power and legitimacy of 
foreign actors bearing 
challenger rules 
• Intensity of collision 
between incumbent and 
challenger rules 
• Coercive : political 
lobbying, different types 
of constraints on local 
interlocutors 
• Mimetic : multiple 
imitations of role model 
actors 
• Normative : Socialisation 
of key actors relayed by 
local institutions of 
socialisation – education 
Frame in part 
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system… 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Trickle-down Trajectories 
Scenarii and actors Conditions Mechanisms 
• Transnational 
organisations and 
supranational institutions 
as directing the process – 
essentially public and 
political process 
• Transnational fields or 
arenas – multiplicity of 
actors, public and private, 
involved 
 
• Centrality and degree of 
openness 
• Weakness of local system 
and degree of dependence 
• Coercive: conditional 
granting of assistance, 
political fiat, legal 
authority and enforcement 
apparatus (EU) 
• Normative: sharing of 
common cognitive frames 
through parallel 
socialisation, processes of 
professionalization, 
responsabilization and 
collective self-monitoring  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 : Transnational Institution Building 
Scenarii and Actors Mode 
• Transnational Organisations. Actors: 
nations, states, governments and civil 
servants (almost exclusively) 
• Supranational Constructions. Actors: 
nations, states, governments and civil 
servants (predominantly) 
• Self-disciplining transnational 
communities. Actors: multiple, public, 
semi-public but also non governmental 
organisations and private. 
• Dominant 
 
 
• Negotiated 
 
 
• Emergent 
 
